Vitaliy Lytvyn

Types of cabinets and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies (1990–2013)

The article is dedicated to analysing types of cabinets and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. The author proposed several classifications of cabinets and analysed which types of cabinets in each classification are more stable. The scientist analysed the experiences of 147 cabinets in ten Central and Eastern European countries and argued that majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets, single-party cabinets are more stable then coalition cabinets. The researcher also suggested the logic of different types of cabinets' stability. Special attention was focused on stability of different types of coalition cabinets.

Keywords: *cabinet, cabinet stability, party and nonparty cabinets, single-party and coalition cabinets, majority and minority cabinets, minimal winning and surplus coalitions, Central and Eastern Europe.*

Віталій Литвин

Типи урядів і урядова стабільність у парламентських демократіях Центрально-Східної Європи (1990–2013)

The issue of cabinet types and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries is largely explored in contemporary political science. It was raised in the studies of such scholars as F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fettelschloss and P. Harfst[1], C. Conrad and S. Golder[2], V. Lytvyn[3]. However, explorations of these researchers usually do not go beyond 2008. That is why they

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[1]   P. Harfst, *Government Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact of Parliaments and Parties*, Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops Copenhagen, 14–19 April 2000, 34 s.; F. Muller-Rommel, K. Fettelschloss, P. Harfst, *Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990–2003)*, "European Journal of Political Research" 2004, vol 43, nr 6, s. 869–893.; F. Mueller-Rommel, *Types of Cabinet Durability in Central Eastern Europe*, Paper posted at the eScholarship Repository, University of California Irvine 2005, 13 s.; K. Fettelschloss, *Continuity and Change of Ministers and Ministries: A Comparative Analysis for Eleven CEE Countries*, Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, University of Budapest, September 8–10, 2005, 19 s.

[2]   C. Conrad, S. Golder, *Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies*, "European Journal of Political Research", 2010, vol 49, nr 1, s. 119–150.

[3]   V. Lytvyn, *Uriadova stabilnist kriz pryzmu partiinykh determinant krain Tsentralnoi Yevropy*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriia: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia", 2009, vol 13, s. 110–118.

need some clarification and expansion, including statistical context. They are necessarily to be implemented given the existing general theoretical parameters of cabinet stability and patterns of cabinet stability in Western Europe, which were revealed in the reserve of such scholars as E. Zimmerman[4], M. Laver and K. Shepsle[5], E. Damgaard[6], D. Sanders and V. Herman[7], M. Taylor and V. Hermann[8], G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns and M. Laver[9], P. van Roozendaal[10], V. Lytvyn[11], Z. Bialoblotskyi[12] etc. On this theoretical basis of the study, we aim to clarify and update the parameters of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. Especially in the context of different types of cabinets.

It is clear that there is no equality in structure of cabinets when we try to observe them from party and political determinants. They are divided into *party* and *nonparty cabinets*. Nonparty cabinet formation takes place when parties in parliament cannot agree about formation of single-party or coalition-party cabinet and dissolution of parliament or its lower chamber is undesirable. Such cabinets are technocratic or transitive. They include experts who belong or not belong to parties, but their affiliation with parties has no value. Duration of such cabinets is often insignificant; they spend current affairs until formation a cabinet on a party basis. It also happens that technocratic cabinet is formed to prevent country from crisis, when trust to basic political parties is too low. Therefore, the overwhelming majority among the cabinets of Central and Eastern European countries is constituted with the party cabinets. They make up over 98 percent of all Central and Eastern European cabinets in 1990–2013 (see details in table 1). Thus, there were technocratic cabinets only in Bulgaria (Lyuben Berov cabinet, 1992–1994) and the Czech Republic (Jan Fischer cabinet, 2009–2010)[13]. There were also several party cabinets with nonparty prime ministers. For example, the cabinets of Andres Tarand (1994–1995) in Estonia, Gordon Bajnai (2009–2010) in Hungary, Andris Šķēle (1995–1997 and 1997) and Guntars Krasts (1997–1998 and 1998) in Latvia, Nicolae

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[4]   E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research" 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.

[5]   M. Laver, K. Shepsle, Events, Equilibria and Government Survival, "American Journal of Political Science" 1998, vol 42, nr 1, s. P. 28–54.

[6]   E. Damgaard, *Cabinet Termination*, [w:] K. Strom, W. Muller, T. Bergman, *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Style in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008.

[7]   D. Sanders, V. Herman, *The Stability and Survival of Governments in Western Europe*, "Acta Politica" 1977, vol 12, nr 3, s. 346–377.

[8]   M. Taylor, V. Hermann, *Party Systems and Government Stability*, "American Political Science Review" 1971, vol 65, nr 1, s. 28–37.

[9]   G. King, J. Alt, N. Burns, M. Laver, *A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies*, "American Journal of Political Science" 1970, vol 34, nr 3, s, 846–871.

[10] P. van Roosendaal, *Cabinets in Multi-party Democracies: The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability*, Wyd. Thesis Publishers 1992, s. 103–112.

[11] V. Lytvyn, *Kontseptualne vyznachennia poniattia „uriadova stabilnist"*, „Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Seriia: Politolohiia, Sotsiolohiia, Filosofiia" 2008, vol 10, s. 37–42.

[12] Z. Bialoblotskyi, *Stabilnist' ta efektyvnist uriadiv u politychnykh systemakh krain Skhidnoi Yevropy*, Wyd. Vydavnychyi tsentr LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2013.

[13] There were also several interim nonparty cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries. For example, the cabinets of Renata Indzhova (1994–1995) and Marin Raykov (2013) in Bulgaria and the cabinet of Jiří Rusnok (2013) in the Czech Republic. However under traditional requirements we do not include interim cabinets into the comparative analysis.

Văcăroiu (1992–1994, 1994–1996 and 1996) and Mugur Isărescu (1999–2000) in Romania and the interim cabinet of Josef Tošovský (1998) in the Czech Republic. Some scholars interpret them as semi-party cabinets, but they are formed with parliamentary parties and majority of ministerial positions in such cabinets are occupied by the members of the governing parties. That's why we treat them as party cabinets.

Table 1. Types of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)[14]

Country	Cabinets	Party cabinets	Nonparty cabinets
Bulgaria	10	9	1
Czech Republic	13	12	1
Estonia	13	13	–
Hungary	10	10	–
Latvia	20	20	–
Lithuania	14	14	–
Poland	16	16	–
Romania	21	21	–
Slovakia	15	15	–
Slovenia	15	15	–
Total (%)	147 (100%)	145 (98.6%)	2 (1.4%)

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz,* Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies,* źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

The statistics regulates that the main classification of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries concerns the party cabinets in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of governments. Such cabinets' structuring is carried out by the criterion of cabinet parties' quantity into the next groups: single-party cabinets and coalition cabinets. According to the quantity calculations of the deputies from the cabinet parties, single-party cabinets share on majority single-party cabinets and minority single-party cabinets. Coalition cabinets are also divided into majority and minority cabinets.

Single-party majority cabinets usually form in presidential republics where president appoints ministers from the members of his own party. However, single-party majority cabinets are also often found in semi-presidential republics, parliamentary republics and parliamentary monarchies when one of the parties has an overwhelming majority of mandates in the parliament or its lower chamber. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013,

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[14] Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. That is why they were calculated on the basis of party cabinets' classification. This means that semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

single-party majority cabinets were peculiar for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and constituted above 5 percent of all party cabinets (see details in table 2).

Coalition majority cabinets usually form in parliamentary republics, semi-presidential republics and parliamentary monarchies, when any party does not singly manage to get parliamentary majority or to enjoy the support of it. Therefore, a parliamentary party enters a coalition with other parliamentary parties and their representatives in process of cabinet formation and given the necessity of the vote of confidence reception in the parliament[15]. Consequently any cabinet resignation does not lead to dissolute parliament and announce new elections in countries where coalition cabinets exist. The head of state in such situation mainly gives the leader of the largest parliamentary party the right to form new cabinet. If any new cabinet is not formed then the right to do it goes to the other party. If the head of state sees that attempts are vain, he/she can dissolute parliament and call an early elections. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013, coalition majority cabinets were peculiar for all countries and constituted above 57 percent of all party cabinets in the region (see details in table 2).

Despite the formal paradoxes of *minority cabinets*, they are actively formed in many European countries after the World War II[16] and after the collapse of the USSR. In Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013, the frequency of minority cabinets' formation is above 37 percent of all party cabinets. Examining the primary factors of minority cabinets' formation, we refer to the remarks of A. Romanyuk[17] that the permission on minority cabinets' formation of parties, which are represented in parliament, can be based on the possibilities of parliamentary committees and commissions influence on the internal and international life of the country. The frequency of minority cabinets' formation also depends on the activity of interests groups in those countries where corporatism received considerable distribution[18]. Finally, the character of mutual relations between the parties also takes important role in minority cabinets' formation[19]. Therefore, according to M. Laver and K. Shepsle, minority cabinet is a natural way-out from a situation of party competition in a parliament[20]. K. Strom researches this type of cabinets in the European parliamentary democracies and considers that the practice of minority cabinets' existence has proved that they need to be measured as a normal result of political competition, because

[15]   P. Collin, *Dictionary of Government and Politics: Second Edition*, Wyd. Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers 1998.

[16]   M. Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 189.

[17]   A. Romanjuk, *Urjady menšosti v krayinach Zahidnoyi Jevropy*, „Visnyk L vivs koho Universytetu: Filosofs ki nauky" 2002, vol 4.

[18]   G. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*, Wyd. Columbia University Press 1986.

[19]   M. Laver, N. Schofield, *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*, Wyd. University of Michigan Press 1998.

[20]   M. Laver, K. Shepsle, *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

they are peculiar for many countries[21]. The reason, which predetermines parties to select an opposition variant, is shown in possibilities to realize their party courses.

Single-party minority cabinets are formed by a party, which has no absolute majority in parliament. Coalition minority cabinets are formed by two or more political parties, which totally have no absolute majority in parliament. However, minority cabinet in any case (single-party or coalition cabinet) should get support of the parliament majority for its statement and functioning. Milosz Zeman cabinet (1998–2002) in Czech Republic, Mart Siimann cabinet (1997–1999) in Estonia, Adrian Nastase cabinet (2003–2004) in Romania and other cabinets are the examples of *single-party minority cabinets*. Cabinets of Calin Popescu-Tariceanu in Romania (2004–2006, 2006–2007 and 2007–2008) and Gediminas Kirkilas in Lithuania (2006–2008) are the basic examples of *coalition minority cabinets*. In Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013, single-party minority cabinets were peculiar for all countries excluding Lithuania and Slovenia and constituted 11 percent of all party cabinets in the region. In return, coalition minority cabinets were peculiar for all countries excluding Hungary and constituted above 26 percent of all party cabinets in the region (see details in table 2).

Table 2. Types of party cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)[22]

Country	Party cabinets	Single-party majority cabinets	Single-party minority cabinets	Coalition majority cabinets	Coalition minority cabinets
Bulgaria	9	2	2	4	1
Czech Republic	12	–	2	7	3
Estonia	13	–	2	9	2
Hungary	10	–	2	8	–
Latvia	20	–	1	11	8
Lithuania	14	3	–	8	3
Poland	16	–	2	11	3
Romania	21	2	3	7	9
Slovakia	15	1	2	8	4
Slovenia	15	–	–	10	5
Total (%)	145 (100%)	8 (5.5%)	16 (11.0%)	83 (57.3%)	38 (26.2%)

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz, Lviv*, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

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[21]   K. Strom, *Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality on Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions*, "Comparative political Studies" 1984, vol 17, nr 2, s. 199–226.

[22]   Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

Almost 60 percent of party cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries are constituted with coalition majority cabinets. Coalition cabinet is the most widespread form of cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe. Coalition majority and coalition minority cabinets constitute above 80 percent of all party cabinets, which have been generated in ten analysed Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013. However, party concentration on coalition cabinets' formation is also interesting. Hungary is an indicator in this disposition, because its coalition cabinets are presented only with coalition majority cabinets. Only 2 cabinets were not coalition cabinets in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. Only 1 cabinet was not coalition cabinets in Latvia.

One more classification of cabinets concerns coalition majority cabinets. Parties based on various configurations under conditions of parliamentary majority support can form some variants of cabinets. For the sake of our ideas' explanation we use the approach and the method of cabinet structure. We make an assumption that formation of cabinet coalition demands from its participants to observe the conditions that: a) basic political parties and electoral blocks search for natural associates to form parliamentary majority; b) all parliamentary partners understand basic directions and purposes of their future activity; c) posts and jobs in coalition cabinet are distributed and programs of cabinet activity are coordinated[23]. Therefore, coalition majority cabinets should be divided into minimal winning (minimal) coalitions and surplus winning (surplus or undersized) coalitions.

Cabinet is considered as *minimal winning coalition* if it is formed with two and more political parties, which constitute the parliamentary majority in sum of their parliamentary mandates, and if exit of at least one cabinet party from parliamentary majority leads to destruct cabinet majority and coalition cabinet. The theory of minimal winning coalitions suggests that desire to receive a maximum quantity of parliamentary supporters is basic motive of parties' activity. This nomination constitutes the purpose itself. Therefore, winning coalition supervises majority of places in parliament. Therefore, there are no parties, which are not obligatory for majority achievement in structure of minimal winning coalition. For example, the cabinet of Robert Fico in Slovakia was formed with three parties after elections to National Council, which took place on July 17, 2006.

Cabinet is considered as *surplus winning* (surplus or undersized) *coalition* if it is formed with two and more political parties, which constitute the parliamentary majority in sum of their parliamentary mandates, provided with the condition that if party (parties), which has surplus status in coalition, leave parliamentary majority, it does not destruct the coalition majority (although destruct the structure of the coalition cabinet). For example, the cabinet of Viktor Orban in Hungary, which was formed on July 6, 1998.

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[23]   M. Laver, I. Budge, *Party Policy and the Government Coalitions*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 1992.

P. Roosendaal, who investigated the differences of mentioned types of coalition majority cabinets, notices that if there is minimal winning coalition than each cabinet party has identical threat to lose public levers of political influence. In return, surplus party, which voices are not critical, can leave cabinet without forcing it to lose parliamentary majority. The primary causes of surplus coalitions' formations are the following: 1). There is a desire to guarantee clever safety of winning coalition status when some party or parties are not considered as reliable (small surplus parties are involved for the sake of safety[24]); 2). There are specific institutional conditions that, for example, are illustrated with the condition demands that some parties and groups should be presented in cabinet. A. Lijphart gives the additional reason for surplus winning coalition formation. Every political party desires to occupy the ideological position in the middle of a cabinet and to strengthen its own party position at the expense of cabinet force.

The distinctive types of coalition majority cabinets are *grand coalitions* and *coalitions of national unity*. Grand coalition is a coalition majority cabinet, which is formed and consolidated with the largest and equal (in the electoral disposition) parliamentary parties. The given term is used for countries where two (or more) dominating and relevant parties with different ideological orientations and a number of small parties present parliament. For example, the cabinet of Sergei Stanishev in Bulgaria, formed on July 16, 2005. Coalition of national unity is a coalition majority cabinet, which is formed and consolidated with all or almost all parliamentary parties. The given term is used for countries where all or almost all relevant parties with different ideological orientations combine cabinets all together. For example, the cabinet of Dimitar Popov in Bulgaria, formed on December 7, 1990. It is necessary to consider the reasons for grand and national unity coalitions' formation: a) national (political or economic) crisis when there are conditions and requirements of national unity and stability, and overcoming ideological differences between parties; b) high fragmentation of small parliamentary parties. Grand coalitions are also the result of comprehensions of grand parties that they have much more similar ideas in their ideologies among themselves than among them and small parties. However even despite this, grand coalition and coalitions of national unity structurally are always the examples of minimal winning or surplus winning coalitions.

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[24] D. Remy, *The Pivotal Party. Definition and Measurement*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1975, vol 3, s. 295–298.

Table 3. Types of coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)[25]

Country	Coalition majority cabinets	Minimum-winning coalitions	Surplus-winning coalitions	Grand coalitions and coalitions of national unity
Bulgaria	4	2	2	2
Czech Republic	7	4	3	–
Estonia	9	9	–	–
Hungary	8	3	5	–
Latvia	11	5	6	1
Lithuania	8	4	4	–
Poland	11	8	3	–
Romania	7	1	6	2
Slovakia	8	7	1	–
Slovenia	10	6	4	–
Total (%)	83 (100%)	49 (59.0%)	34 (41.0%)	5 (6.0%)

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies,* źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

The absolute mainstream among coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe is constituted with minimal winning coalitions, which give almost 60 percent of all coalition majority cabinets in all countries of the region (see details in table 3). It is interesting that there were no minimal winning coalitions in Romania in 1990–2008, because it was represented only with surplus winning coalitions. The first minimal winning coalitions in Romania was formed by Emil Boc on December 22, 2008. However, there were no surplus coalitions in Estonia and the only one surplus coalition in Slovakia. Romania and Hungary are the only countries in the region where surplus coalitions constitute an absolute majority of coalition majority cabinets. Instead, there is a parity among minimal winning and surplus coalitions in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania.

Consideration types of cabinet brought us to necessity of their combination with *cabinet stability*. This direction of comparative researches is associated with M. Laver and N. Schofield ideas. They offered the procedure how to determinate cabinet stability and duration depending on the type of cabinet[26]. Taking into account the ideas of W. Riker[27], L. Dodd combined influence of coalition cabinets' types on cabinet stability. Consequently, the scientist checked a hypothesis that duration of cabinet is a measure function, to which it deviates from the minimal

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[25]   Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

[26]   M. Gallagher, M. Laver, P. Mair, *Representative Government in Western Europe*, Wyd. McGraw-Hill Education 1992, s. 207.

[27]   W. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1962.

support, overcoming its previous status[28]. This approach smoothly passes into conception and substantiation that means maximum duration of minimal winning coalitions. For example, P. Roosendaal noticed that if a cabinet is minimal winning coalition then each party in a cabinet has an identical threat to lose its powers. On the contrary, the party, which voices are not critical, may presume to leave cabinet, rushing a cabinet resignation. B. Grofman offered a controversial approach and confirmed that relations between minimal winning coalitions and their duration are conditional[29]. He made an idea that minimal winning status of coalition cannot explain essential changes of cabinet duration within countries. He also approved that relations between cabinet duration and its minimal winning status grow out substantially of high average cabinet duration in countries, where there are only two or three essential political parties and minimal winning coalitions are traditional. In return, low cabinet duration is peculiar for countries with significant amount of parties where minimal winning coalitions are not often.

Proceeding such reasoning, we come up to the conclusions, received by E. Zimmerman: majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets; single-party cabinets are more stable than coalition cabinets; stability of cabinets grows up in minimal winning coalitions, decreasing from big to small coalitions and it is the least in minority cabinets; stability of single-party majority cabinets is higher than stability of minimal winning coalition cabinets, decreasing according to reduction of voices quantity, on which minimal winning coalition leans and is the least if cabinets leans on minority in parliament; cabinet stability decreases, if opposition increases its representation quantity in parliament[30].

Based on the analysis of the duration and stability of cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013 (see details in table 4), we argue that the cabinets in Bulgaria and Hungary are considered as the most stable. The cabinets in these countries exist on the average more than two years. The cabinets in Latvia, Poland and Romania are the least stable, because the average duration of their offices is close to the rate in one year. On the average, cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries exist 496 days that is a little bit less than year and a half (1.36 year), and it is less than in Western-European consolidated democracies (even less than in these countries during 1945–1990, when cabinets in Western-European countries lasted on average 680 days)[31]. Proceeding from the calculation of cabinet stability indexes, we receive a similar situation. The highest indexes are reserved to Bulgaria and Hungary (more than 0.50), and the lowest indexes are reserved to Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia (less than 0.40). The average index of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern

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[28] L. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1976.; L. Dodd, *Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game Theoretic Analysis*, „American Political Science Review" 1974, vol 68, s. 1093–1117.

[29] B. Grofman, *The Comparative Analysis of Coalition Formation and Duration: Distinguishing Between-Country and Within-Country Effects*, „British Journal of Political Science" 1989, vol 2, s. 291–302.

[30] E. Zimmerman, *Government Stability in Six European Countries during the World Economic Crisis of the 1930s: Some Preliminary Considerations*, „European Journal of Political Research" 1987, vol 15, nr 1, s. 23–52.

[31] J. Woldendorp, H. Keman, I. Budge, *The Stability of Parliamentary Democracies. Duration, Type and Termination of Governments*, "European Journal of Political Research" 1993, vol 24, s. 108.

European countries constitutes 0.39. It means that most cabinets in the region do not pass half of their legal executive terms and finish before regular parliamentary elections.

Table 4. Cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)[32]

Country	Cabinet duration, years	Index of cabinet stability	Party cabinet duration, years	Nonparty cabinet duration, years	Index of party cabinet stability	Index of non-party cabinet stability
Bulgaria	2.10	0.63	2.15	1.65	0.64	0.53
Czech Republic	1.46	0.41	1.50	0.96	0.42	0.25
Estonia	1.48	0.40	1.48	–	0.40	–
Hungary	2.11	0.53	2.11	–	0.53	–
Latvia	0.92	0.31	0.92	–	0.31	–
Lithuania	1.46	0.37	1.46	–	0.37	–
Poland	1.22	0.36	1.22	–	0.36	–
Romania	1.03	0.29	1.03	–	0.29	–
Slovakia	1.35	0.41	1.35	–	0.41	–
Словенія	1.34	0.39	1.34	–	0.39	–
Total	1.36	0.39	1.37	1.31	0.39	0.39

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz,* Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

It is also clear that party cabinets are more stable than nonparty (technocratic) cabinets. Average duration of party cabinets is about 1.37 year (500 days) while nonparty cabinets last on the average 1.31 year (478 days). However, the indexes of cabinet stability stay down by the analogy: technocratic and party cabinets receive the index 0.39, but it does not influence the frequency rate of different cabinet types' formation. It was argued earlier that technocratic cabinets are not the basic model of governance for the Central and Eastern European countries and we can meet them rarely.

Nevertheless, we received unexpected results, which essence is reduced to the fact that single-party majority cabinets are not the most stable party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe. They last for 0.03 year less than coalition majority cabinets. In return, single-party cabinets (both majority and minority) are more stable than coalition cabinets both majority and minority. Because of it, Zimmerman's conclusion, which successfully works in Western-European countries, partly verifies data in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, another hypothesis is correct, because majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets (see details in table 5).

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[32] Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

Table 5. Party cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)

Country	Single-party majority cabinet duration, years	Single-party minority cabinet duration, years	Coalition majority cabinet duration, years	Coalition minority cabinet duration, years
Bulgaria	3.01	2.32	1.95	0.93
Czech Republic	–	1.97	1.49	1.21
Estonia	–	1.09	1.56	1.51
Hungary	–	0.96	2.44	–
Latvia	–	1.25	1.11	0.57
Lithuania	1.27	–	1.73	1.00
Poland	–	0.92	1.48	0.56
Romania	0.64	1.14	0.93	1.15
Slovakia	–	0.48	1.86	0.78
Slovenia	–	–	1.90	0.33
Total	1.59	1.26	1.62	0.85

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Polityczni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz*, Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies*, źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

Simultaneously, the hypothesis that stability of single-party majority cabinets is higher than stability of coalition majority cabinets, decreasing accordingly to reduction of quantity of coalition cabinets voices of parliamentary support, and is the least if a cabinet has support from parliamentary minority, also does not work correctly. The matter is that single-party majority cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries usually last for 1.59 year, whereas coalition majority cabinets function more than 1.60 year, although single-party minority cabinets last for about 1.26 year. Because of calculations, we are to make conclusion and characterize Central and Eastern European countries as countries with a partly specific situation in the interpretation of cabinet stability, which appreciably differs from the situation in Western Europe: although majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe last longer than minority cabinets, however one-party cabinets last less than majority coalition cabinets. In addition, minority coalition cabinets are also relatively stable. Therefore, Z. Maoz and B. Russett consider that "minority cabinets are not more limited than majority cabinets"[33]. Moreover, minority cabinets can be less conflictive than majority cabinets. B. Prins and C. Sprecher agree with such theoretical statement and try to argue that there is a resistance to the tasks and purposes, which coalitions operate, when there is growth of pressure upon cabinet[34]. Exploring

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[33]   Z. Maoz, B. Russett, *Normative and structural causes of the democratic peace, 1946–1986*, "American Political Science Review" 1993, vol 87, s. 626.

[34]   B. Prins, C. Sprecher, *Institutional constraints, political opposition, and interstate dispute escalation: Evidence from parliamentary systems, 1946–1989*, "Journal of Peace Research" 1999, vol 36, s. 271–287.

initial system conflicts and analysing competing aspects of cabinet activity, the authors offer to define coalition majority cabinets as more dangerous in institutional conflicts escalation[35]. This is supplemented with the information that coalition majority cabinets are not the most stable in terms of indexes of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Table 6 argues that the stability of different types of cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe corresponds to the theory of cabinet stability and to the logic of cabinet stability in Western Europe. The difference is that single-party majority cabinets are here more convincible in comparison with coalition majority cabinets. The difference between average indexes of stability of single-party majority cabinets and coalition majority cabinets constitutes 0.02.

Table 6. Indexes of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)

Country	Index of single-party majority cabinet stability	Index of single-party minority cabinet stability	Index of coalition majority cabinet stability	Index of coalition minority cabinet stability
Bulgaria	0.91	0.65	0.60	0.24
Czech Republic	–	0.50	0.40	0.42
Estonia	–	0.28	0.44	0.39
Hungary	–	0.24	0.62	–
Latvia	–	0.54	0.37	0.18
Lithuania	0.33	–	0.44	0.25
Poland	–	0.29	0.43	0.19
Romania	0.28	0.29	0.26	0.32
Slovakia	–	0.21	0.56	0.23
Slovenia	–	–	0.54	0.11
Total	0.48	0.36	0.46	0.25

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz,* Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies,* źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

This results in a logical order of different types of cabinets' stability: single-party majority cabinets, coalition majority cabinets, single-party minority cabinets and coalition minority cabinets. However, it also makes us to address K. Strom's ideas that it is necessary to consider that party cabinets' agreements according to the expenses of political parties are the basic motive powers of formation processes and cabinet dissolutions[36]. The researcher explains that institutions, which considerably affect opposition parties (for example, in parliamentary committees), can characterize countries where minority cabinets are regular. If party benefits from joining a cabinet are doubtful, it will obviously support a cabinet, not entering it. If party

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[35] M. Ireland, S. Gartner, *Time to Fight. Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution" 2001, vol 45, s. 547–568.

[36] K. Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

gets surplus benefit through such alternative, it makes a cabinet more desirable and stable. If value of an external choice increases for at least one party in a cabinet, it becomes a necessary condition of cabinet instability. Therefore, the main idea is that cabinet breaks up, when its accessible benefits had been used.

We checked this hypothesis during the analysis of cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European countries. Besides, D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson filled it with the completions[37]. The authors proved, that the size of the "pie" that is accessible in a cabinet, is also the main determinant of cabinet stability. Majority cabinets finish their existence so often, how often formatter is deviated through the status and position of parties. In return, minority cabinets finish their existence when status-quo is comprehensible for formatter. Therefore, M. Laver and K. Shepsle foresee formation of minority cabinets only in the cases when formatter has strong positions in period of cabinet initiation. Unique theoretical model, which connects party expenses with cabinet unity, does not concentrate on minority or majority cabinets, but pays attention on a unity of legislative coalitions and cabinet expenses[38].

Table 7. Coalition majority cabinet duration in Central and Eastern European countries (as of 2013)[39]

Country	Coalition majority cabinets, years	Minimum-winning coalition duration, years	Additive-winning coalition duration, years	Grand coalition duration, years
Bulgaria	1.95	1.53	2.37	2.37
Czech Republic	1.49	1.69	1.22	–
Estonia	1.56	1.56	–	–
Hungary	2.44	1.87	2.87	–
Latvia	1.11	0.80	1.34	1.13
Lithuania	1.73	2.20	1.38	–
Poland	1.48	1.63	1.13	–
Romania	0.93	0.80	0.95	0.94
Slovakia	1.86	1.58	3.84	–
Slovenia	1.90	2.28	1.15	–
Total[40]	1.62	1.64	1.58	1.55

Źródło: A. Romanyuk, V. Lytvyn, N. Panchak-Byaloblotska, *Politychni instytuty krayin Tsentral'no-Skhidnoyi Yevropy: porivnyal'nyy analiz,* Lviv, Wyd. LNU imeni Ivana Franka 2014.; H. Döring, P. Manow, *Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies,* źródło: http://www.parlgov.org/ [odczyt: 15.03.2015].

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[37] D Diermeier, R Stevenson, *Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events*, "American Political Science Review" 2000, vol 94, s. 627–640.

[38] T. Persson, G. Roland, G. Tabellini, *Comparative politics and public finance*, "Journal of Political Economy" 2000, vol 108, s. 1121–1161.

[39] Interim cabinets were not taken into account. Semi-party cabinets were not included in our calculating the total number of cabinets also, because they are not typical examples of party cabinets. Semi-party cabinets were calculated in relation to the total number of party cabinets in the region.

[40] The estimation is based on the arithmetic mean sum of all cabinets in Central and Eastern European countries in 1990–2013.

Behind the results of table 7, which displays the third classification of cabinets, which have been carried out to the Central and Eastern European countries, we come to the conclusion, that minimal winning coalitions are considered as the most durable cabinets in comparison with other types of majority coalitions. This result coincides with the research of B. Powell, concerning cabinets in Western-European countries[41]. We explain such tendency with the fact that duration of minimal winning coalitions is a measure function, to which coalitions deviate from a minimal support. If cabinet is a minimal winning coalition, then each party in the cabinet has an identical irresistible risk to lose imperious powers. On the contrary, the party, which voices are not critical, may leave a cabinet, thus technically accelerating cabinet dissolution. However, the duration of surplus winning coalitions in Central and Eastern European countries is also essential and differs from minimal winning coalitions only for 0.06 year. Therefore, we should take on attention on the specified designs of coalition majority cabinets as the most perspective.

Concluding, it should be noted that *cabinet stability is an abstract concept*, which is to be defined with help of the following specifications. It is an ability of a cabinet to remain at performance in any situations of shifting from equilibrium's state of political system and to return to the previous condition. We notice two parameters in such definition of cabinet stability. Internal parameter is an infringement of balance based on cabinet contradictions. External parameter is an influence of institutional/contextual criteria of political system.

Based on the techniques and toolkit to define cabinets' types, we carried out comparative analysis of 147 cabinets' stability in Central and Eastern Europe in 1990–2013 (see details in Annex A) and concluded that: 1) party cabinets are the overwhelming majority among cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 2) party cabinets are more stable than nonparty governments; 3) coalition cabinets are the overwhelming majority among party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 4) single-party majority and coalition majority cabinets are the most durable party cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe, however single-party cabinets are more stable then coalition cabinets; 5) minimal winning coalitions are the overwhelming majority among coalition majority cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe; 6) minimal winning coalitions are considered as the most durable cabinets in a comparison with other types of coalition cabinets.

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[41]   B. Powell, *Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1982.

Types and stability of cabinets in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies[42]

Table A.1 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Bulgaria (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Dimitar Popov	07.12.1990 – 08.11.1991	BSP + SDS + BZNS + n.p.	CMJ/SWC (CNU)	n.p.	371/400	331	0,91	0,69
Philip Dimitrov	08.11.1991 – 28.12.1992	SDS	SPMN	SDS	110/240	410	1,12	0,36
Lyuben Berov	30.12.1992 – 02.09.1994	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	602	1,65	0,53
Reneta Indzhova	11.10.1994 – 25.01.1995	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	104	0,28	0,09
Zhan Videnov	25.01.1995 – 28.12.1996	BSP	SPMJ	BSP	125/240	693	1,90	0,82
Stefan Sofiyanski	12.02.1997 – 20.05.1997	SDS	SPMN	SDS	69/240	98	0,27	0,12
Ivan Kostov	21.05.1997 – 23.07.2001	ODS	SPMJ	ODS	137/240	1502	4,12	1,00
S. Sakskoburggotski (I)	24.07.2001 – 10.03.2004	NDSV + DPS	CMJ/MWC	NDSV	141/240	946	2,59	0,65
S. Sakskoburggotski (II)	10.03.2004 – 21.02.2005	NDSV + DPS	CMN	NDSV	117/240	341	0,93	0,24
S. Sakskoburggotski (III)	22.02.2005 – 15.08.2005	NDSV + DPS + NV	CMJ/MWC	NDSV	141/240	173	0,47	0,11
Sergei Stanishev	16.08.2005 – 05.07.2009	KzB + NDSV + DPS	CMJ/SWC (GC)	KzB	169/240	1399	3,83	0,96
Boyko Borisov	27.07.2009 – 20.02.2013	GERB	SPMN	GERB	116/240	1283	3,52	0,93
Marin Raykov	13.03.2013 – 29.05.2013	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/240	76	0,24	0,06
Plamen Oresharski	29.05.2013 – acting	KzB + DPS + n.p.	CMN	n.p.	120/240	acting		

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[42] Legend: CD – cabinet duration; d. – in days; y. – in years; ICS – index of cabinet stability; n.p. – nonparty (prime minister, composition of cabinet); SPMJ – single-party majority cabinet; SPMN – single-party minority cabinet; CMJ – coalition majority cabinet; CMN – coalition minority cabinet; MWC – minimal winning coalition, SWC – surplus winning coalition; GC – grand coalition; CNU – coalition of national unity; T – technocratic (nonparty) cabinet; * – refer to the party as part of cabinet, which is not represented in the parliament or is represented in the parliament, but not for the parliamentary elections and because of the results of the political processes in the parliamentary arena. Grey colour allocates interim cabinets.

Table A.2 Features of cabinet composition and stability in the Czech Republic (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions'design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Václav Klaus (I)	02.07.1992 – 31.12.1992	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA + KDS	CMJ/MWC	ODS	105/200	179	0,49	0,12
Václav Klaus (II)	01.01.1993 – 01.06.1996	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA + KDS	CMJ/MWC	ODS	105/200	1230	3,37	0,86
Václav Klaus (III)	04.07.1996 – 30.11.1997	ODS + KDU/CSL + ODA	CMN	ODS	99/200	506	1,39	0,68
Josef Tošovský	02.01.1998 – 20.06.1998	KDU/CSL + ODA + US* + n.p.	CMN	n.p.	31/200	168	0,46	0,23
Miloš Zeman	17.07.1998 – 15.06.2002	CSSD	SPMN	CSSD	74/200	1408	3,86	0,98
Vladimír Špidla	15.07.2002 – 01.07.2004	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	706	1,93	0,49
Stanislav Gross (I)	04.08.2004 – 30.03.2005	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	236	0,65	0,17
Stanislav Gross (II)	31.03.2005 – 25.04.2005	CSSD + US/DEU	CMN	CSSD	88/200	25	0,07	0,02
Jiří Paroubek	25.04.2005 – 03.06.2006	CSSD + KDU/CSL + US-DEU	CMJ/SWC	CSSD	132/200	398	1,09	0,29
Mirek Topolánek (I)	04.09.2006 – 03.10.2006	ODS + n.p.	SPMN	ODS	81/200	29	0,08	0,02
Mirek Topolánek (II)	09.01.2007 – 24.03.2009	ODS + KDU/CSL + SZ	CMN	ODS	100/200	795	2,18	0,55
Jan Fischer	07.06.2009 – 29.05.2010	n.p.	T	n.p.	0/200	352	0,96	0,25
Petr Nečas (I)	28.06.2010 – 17.04.2012	ODS + TOP09 + VV	CMJ/MWC	ODS	118/200	649	1,78	0,53
Petr Nečas (II)	27.04.2012 – 17.06.2013	ODS + TOP09 + LIDEM (VV)	CMJ/MWC	ODS	101/200	410 1,12 0,33			
Jiří Rusnok	10.07.2013 – 25.10.2013	n.p.	T	n.p.	4/200	105	0,29	0,09

Table A.3 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Estonia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Mart Laar (I)	21.10.1992 – 26.09.1994	RKI + ERSP + SDE	CMJ/MWC	RKI	51/100	695	1,90	0,79
Andres Tarand	03.11.1994 – 05.03.1995	RKI+ERSP+SDE+P*+n.p.	CMJ/MWC	n.p.	51/100	122	0,33	0,14
Tiit Vähi (I)	17.04.1995 – 11.10.1995	EKK + EK	CMJ/MWC	EKK	57/101	174	0,48	0,12
Tiit Vähi (II)	03.11.1995 – 20.11.1996	EKK + ERe	CMJ/MWC	EKK	60/101	377	1,03	0,26
Tiit Vähi (III)	01.12.1996 – 25.02.1997	EKK	SPMN	EKK	41/101	84	0,23	0,06
Mart Siimann	14.03.1997 – 07.03.1999	EKK	SPMN	EKK	41/101	713	1,95	0,49
Mart Laar (II)	29.03.1999 – 08.01.2002	I + ERe + SDE	CMJ/MWC	I	53/101	999	2,74	0,70
Siim Kallas	28.01.2002 – 09.04.2003	EK + ERe	CMN	ERe	46/101	431	1,18	0,30
Juhan Parts	10.04.2003 – 13.04.2005	ResP + ERe + ERL	CMJ/MWC	ResP	60/101	723	1,98	0,50
Andrus Ansip (I)	13.04.2005 – 04.04.2007	EK + ERe + ERL	CMJ/MWC	ERe	60/101	711	1,95	0,49
Andrus Ansip (II)	05.04.2007 – 21.05.2009	ERe + IRL + SDE	CMJ/MWC	ERe	60/101	766	2,10	0,53
Andrus Ansip (III)	22.05.2009 – 05.04.2011	ERe + IRL	CMN	ERe	50/101	673	1,84	0,47
Andrus Ansip (IV)	05.04.2011 – acting	ERe + IRL	CMJ/MWC	ERe	56/101		acting	

Table A.4 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Hungary (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
József Antall	23.05.1990 – 12.12.1993	MDF + FKgP + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	MDF	229/386	1279	3,50	0,86
Péter Boross	21.12.1993 – 29.05.1994	MDF + FKgP + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	MDF	229/386	158	0,43	0,11
Gyula Horn	15.07.1994 – 24.05.1998	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/SWC	MSzP	278/386	1389	3,81	0,97
Viktor Orbán (I)	06.07.1998 – 21.04.2002	Fidesz + FKgP + MDF	CMJ/SWC	Fidesz	213/386	1365	3,74	0,97
Péter Medgyessy	27.05.2002 – 19.08.2004	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWC	MSzP	198/386	802	2,20	0,56
Ferenc Gyurcsány (I)	29.09.2004 – 23.04.2006	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWC	MSzP	198/386	564	1,55	0,39
Ferenc Gyurcsány (II)	09.06.2006 – 26.04.2008	MSzP + SzDSz	CMJ/MWC	MSzP	210/386	677	1,85	0,46
Ferenc Gyurcsány (III)	01.05.2008 – 28.03.2009	MSzP	SPMN	MSzP	190/386	327	0,90	0,22
Gordon Bajnai	14.04.2009 – 25.04.2010	MSzP + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	190/386	371	1,02	0,25
Viktor Orbán (II)	29.05.2010 – acting	Fidesz + KDNP	CMJ/SWC	Fidesz	263/386		acting	

Table A.5 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Latvia (1993–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Valdis Birkavs	03.08.1993 – 14.09.1994	LC + LZS	CMN	LC	48/100	401	1,10	0,48
Māris Gailis	15.09.1994 – 20.12.1995	LC + TPA*	SPMN	LC	36/100	455	1,25	0,54
Andris Šķēle (I)	21.12.1995 – 12.02.1997	DPS + LC + TB + LVP + KDS* + LNNK + LZP* + LZS* + n.p.	CMJ/SWC (CNU)	n.p.	65/100	412	1,13	0,38
Andris Šķēle (II)	13.02.1997 – 28.07.1997	DPS+LC+TB+KDS*+ LNNK+LZP*+LZS*+n.p.	CMJ/MWC	n.p.	57/100	165	0,42	0,15
Guntars Krasts (I)	07.08.1997 – 08.04.1998	DPS + LC + KDS* + LZS* + TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	TB/LNNK	53/100	241	0,66	0,22
Guntars Krasts (II)	09.04.1998 – 03.10.1998	LC+KDS+TB/LNNK+LZS	CMN	TB/LNNK	35/100	174	0,48	0,16
Vilis Krištopans (I)	26.11.1998 – 03.02.1999	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMN	LC	46/100	67	0,18	0,05
Vilis Krištopans (II)	04.02.1999 – 15.07.1999	LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMN	LC	46/100	161	0,44	0,11
Andris Šķēle (III)	16.07.1999 – 03.05.2000	TP + LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	TP	62/100	287	0,79	0,20
Andris Bērziņš	05.05.2000 – 02.11.2002	TP + LC + TB/LNNK + JP	CMJ/SWC	LC	70/100	899	2,46	0,62
Einars Repše	07.11.2002 – 05.02.2004	JL+ZZS+LPP+TB/LNNK	CMJ/MWC	JL	55/100	448	1,23	0,31
Indulis Emsis	09.03.2004 – 01.12.2004	TP + ZZS + LPP	CMN	ZZS	42/100	262	0,72	0,18
Aigars Kalvītis (I)	02.12.2004 – 08.04.2006	JL + TP + ZZS + LPP	CMJ/SWC	TP	68/100	486	1,33	0,34
Aigars Kalvītis (II)	09.04.2006 – 06.11.2006	TP + ZZS + LPP	CMN	TP	42/100	207	0,57	0,14
Aigars Kalvītis (III)	07.11.2006 – 19.12.2007	TP + ZZS + LPP/LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	TP	59/100	402	1,10	0,28
Ivars Godmanis	20.12.2007 – 20.02.2009	TP + ZZS + LPP/LC + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	TP	59/100	420	1,15	0,29
Valdis Dombrovskis (I)	26.02.2009 – 17.03.2010	TP + ZZS + JL + PS* + TB/LNNK	CMJ/SWC	JL	67/100	381	1,04	0,27
Valdis Dombrovskis (II)	17.03.2010 – 02.10.2010	ZZS+JL+PS*+TB/LNNK	CMN	JL	44/100	195	0,53	0,14
Valdis Dombrovskis (III)	03.11.2010 – 17.09.2011	V + ZZS	CMJ/MWC	V	55/100	332	0,91	0,96
Valdis Dombrovskis (IV)	25.10.2011 – acting	V + ZRP + TB/LNNK	CMN	V	50/100	acting		

Table A.6 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Lithuania (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD.d.	CD.y.	ICS
Bronislovas Lubys	02.12.1992 – 15.03.1993	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	103	0,28	0,07
Adolfas Šleževičius	16.03.1993 – 08.02.1996	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	1042	2,85	0,74
Laurynas Stankevičius	23.02.1996 – 03.11.1996	LDDP	SPMJ	LDDP	73/141	250	0,68	0,18
Gediminas Vagnorius	04.12.1996 – 03.05.1999	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	869	2,38	0,61
Rolandas Paksas	18.05.1999 – 27.10.1999	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	159	0,44	0,11
Andrius Kubilius (I)	03.11.1999 – 08.10.2000	TS-LK + LKDP + LCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LK	99/141	335	0,92	0,23
Rolandas Paksas (II)	26.10.2000 – 20.06.2001	LLS + NS	CMN	LLS	63/141	234	0,64	0,16
Algirdas Brazauskas (I)	03.07.2001 – 24.10.2004	LDDP + NS	CMJ/MWC	LDDP	79/141	1191	3,26	0,82
Algirdas Brazauskas (II)	14.12.2004 – 11.04.2006	DP + LSDP + NS + LVLS	CMJ/MWC	LSDP	80/141	477	1,31	0,33
Algirdas Brazauskas (III)	12.04.2006 – 01.06.2006	DP + LSDP + LVLS	CMN	LSDP	69/141	49	0,13	0,03
Gediminas Kirkilas	18.07.2006 – 26.10.2008	LSDP + LiCS + LVLS + PDP*	CMN	LSDP	55/141	818	2,24	0,57
Andrius Kubilius (II)	27.11.2008 – 21.09.2010	TS-LKD + TPP + LRLS + LiCS	CMJ/SWC	TS-LKD	79/141	654	1,79	0,45
Andrius Kubilius (III)	21.09.2010 – 14.10.2012	TS-LKD + LiCS-TPP + LRLS	CMJ/MWC	TS-LKD	78/141	743	2,04	0,52
Algirdas Butkevičius	22.11.2012 – acting	LSDP + DP + TT + LLRA	CMJ/MWC	LSDP	85/141	acting		

Table A.7 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Poland (1991–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Jan Olszewski	23.12.1991 – 04.06.1992	ZChN + PC + PL	CMN	PC	121/460	161	0,44	0,24
Waldemar Pawlak (I)	05.06.1992 – 07.07.1992	PSL	SPMN	PSL	48/460	32	0,09	0,05
Hanna Suchocka (I)	11.07.1992 – 28.04.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PL + PPG* + PCD	CMJ/SWC	UD	241/460	287	0,79	0,42
Hanna Suchocka (II)	29.04.1993 – 28.05.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PPG* + PCD	CMN	UD	217/460	29	0,08	0,04
Hanna Suchocka (III)	28.05.1993 – 19.09.1993	UD + ZChN + PSL + KLD + PL + PPG* + PCD	CMJ/SWC	UD	241/460	111	0,30	0,16
Waldemar Pawlak (II)	26.10.1993 – 07.02.1995	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PSL	303/460	461	1,26	0,32
Józef Oleksy	06.03.1995 – 24.01.1996	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	SLD	303/460	318	0,87	0,22
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	7.02.1996 – 21.09.1997	SLD + PSL	CMJ/MWC	SLD	303/460	584	1,60	0,40
Jerzy Buzek (I)	31.10.1997 – 06.06.2000	AWS + UW	CMJ/MWC	AWS	261/460	936	2,56	0,65
Jerzy Buzek (II)	07.06.2000 – 18.10.2001	AWS	SPMN	AWS	201/460	491	1,35	0,34
Leszek Miller (I)	19.10.2001 – 03.03.2003	SLD + PSL + UP	CMJ/SWC	SLD	258/460	494	1,35	0,34
Leszek Miller (II)	04.03.2003 – 02.05.2004	SLD + UP	CMN	SLD	216/460	418	1,15	0,29
Marek Belka	24.06.2004 – 25.09.2005	SLD + PSL + UP + SDPL*	CMJ/SWC	SLD	257/460	451	1,24	0,31
K. Marcinkiewicz (I)	10.11.2005 – 04.05.2006	PiS	SPMN	PiS	155/460	174	0,48	0,23
K. Marcinkiewicz (II)	05.05.2006 – 10.07.2006	PiS + SRP + LPR	CMJ/MWC	PiS	245/460	65	0,18	0,09
Jarosław Kaczyński (I)	14.07.2006 – 13.08.2007	PiS + SRP + LPR	CMJ/MWC	PiS	245/460	389	1,07	0,52
Jarosław Kaczyński (II)	13.08.2007 – 19.10.2007	PiS	SPMN	PiS	155/460	66	0,18	0,09
Donald Tusk (I)	16.11.2007 – 09.10.2011	PO + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PO	240/460	1403	3,84	0,98
Donald Tusk (II)	18.11.2011 – acting	PO + PSL	CMJ/MWC	PO	235/460		acting	

Table A.8 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Romania (1990–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions'design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD, d.	CD, y.	ICS
Petre Roman (I)	28.06.1990 – 30.04.1991	FSN	SPMJ	FSN	263/396	302	0,83	0,36
Petre Roman (II)	30.04.1991 – 16.10.1991	FSN	SPMJ	FSN	263/396	166	0,45	0,20
Theodor Stolojan	16.10.1991 – 18.11.1992	FSN + PNL + MER + PDAR	CMJ/SWC (CNU)	PNL	313/396	392	1,07	0,46
Nicolae Văcăroiu (I)	13.11.1992 – 17.08.1994	FDSN + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	117/341	634	1,74	0,43
Nicolae Văcăroiu (II)	18.08.1994 – 01.09.1996	FDSN + PUNR + n.p.	CMN	n.p.	147/341	733	2,01	0,50
Nicolae Văcăroiu (III)	02.09.1996 – 11.12.1996	FDSN + n.p.	SPMN	n.p.	117/341	99	0,27	0,07
Victor Ciorbea (I)	12.12.1996 – 05.02.1998	PNTCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	CMJ/SWC	PNTCD	200/343	413	1,13	0,28
Victor Ciorbea (II)	06.02.1998 – 30.03.1998	PNTCD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	CMN	PNTCD	157/343	54	0,15	0,04
Radu Vasile (I)	15.04.1998 – 29.10.1999	PNTCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + PER	CMJ/SWC	PNTCD	200/343	554	1,52	0,38
Radu Vasile (II)	30.10.1999 – 13.12.1999	PNTCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR	CMJ/SWC	PNTCD	195/343	43	0,12	0,03
Mugur Isărescu	21.12.1999 – 26.11.2000	PNTCD + PD + PNL + UDMR + PSDR + n.p.	CMJ/SWC	n.p.	195/343	335	0,92	0,23
Adrian Năstase (I)	28.12.2000 – 19.06.2003	PSD + PUR	CMN	PSD	160/345	891	2,44	0,62
Adrian Năstase (II)	19.06.2003 – 28.11.2004	PSD	SPMN	PSD	155/345	519	1,42	0,36
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (I)	29.12.2004 – 03.12.2006	PNL+PD+UDMR+PUR	CMN	PNL	153/332	694	1,90	0,48
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (II)	04.12.2006 – 01.04.2007	PNL + PD + UDMR	CMN	PNL	134/332	117	0,32	0,08
C. Popescu-Tăriceanu (III)	02.04.2007 – 30.11.2008	PNL + UDMR	CMN	PNL	86/332	598	1,64	0,41
Emil Boc (I)	22.12.2008 – 13.10.2009	PDL + PSD	CMJ/MWC (GC)	PDL	225/334	291	0,80	0,20
Emil Boc (II)	23.12.2009 – 06.02.2012	PDL + UDMR + UNPR	CMN	PDL	153/334	763	1,09	0,53
Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu	09.02.2012 – 27.04.2012	PDL + UDMR + UNPR	CMN	PDL	158/334	78	0,21	0,05
Victor Ponta (I)	07.05.2012 – 09.12.2012	PSD + PNL + PUR	CMN	PSD	147/334	212	0,58	0,15
Victor Ponta (II)	21.12.2012 – acting	PSD+PNL + PC (USL)	CMJ/SWC	PSD	273/412			acting

Table A.9 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Slovakia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions'design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD.d.	CD.y.	ICS
Vladimír Mečiar (I)	24.06.1992 – 01.01.1993	HZDS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	89/150	187	0,51	0,22
Vladimír Mečiar (II)	12.01.1993 – 18.03.1993	HZDS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	89/150	66	0,18	0,08
Vladimír Mečiar (III)	19.03.1993 – 16.11.1993	HZDS	SPMN	HZDS	66/150	237	0,65	0,28
Vladimír Mečiar (IV)	17.11.1993 – 11.03.1994	HZDS	SPMN	HZDS	81/150	114	0,31	0,14
Jozef Moravčík	16.03.1994 – 01.10.1994	SDL + KDH + APR* + AdS* + NDS*	CMN	APR*	71/150	195	0,53	0,23
Vladimír Mečiar (V)	12.12.1994 – 26.09.1998	HZDS + ZRS + SNS	CMJ/MWC	HZDS	83/150	1364	3,74	0,95
Mikuláš Dzurinda (I)	30.10.1998 – 21.09.2002	SDK + SDL + SMK-MKP + SOP	CMJ/SWC	SDK	93/150	1401	3,84	0,98
Mikuláš Dzurinda (II)	16.10.2002 – 08.12.2003	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH + ANO	CMJ/MWC	SDKU	78/150	412	1,13	0,31
Mikuláš Dzurinda (III)	08.12.2003 – 01.09.2005	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH + ANO	CMN	SDKU	71/150	623	1,71	0,46
Mikuláš Dzurinda (IV)	02.09.2005 – 06.02.2006	SDKU + SMK-MKP + KDH	CMN	SDKU	55/150	154	0,42	0,11
Mikuláš Dzurinda (V)	07.02.2006 – 17.06.2006	SDKU + SMK-MKP	CMN	SDKU	48/150	130	0,36	0,10
Robert Fico (I)	04.07.2006 – 12.06.2010	SMER + SNS + HZDS	CMJ/MWC	SMER	85/150	1418	3,88	0,99
Iveta Radičová (I)	08.07.2010 – 11.10.2011	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CMJ/MWC	SDKU-SD	79/150	453	1,24	0,72
Iveta Radičová (II)	20.10.2011 – 10.03.2012	SDKU-DS + SaS + KDH + MH	CMJ/MWC	SDKU-SD	79/150	140	0,38	0,22
Robert Fico (II)	04.04.2012 – acting	SMER	SPMJ	SMER	83/150	acting		

Table A.10 Features of cabinet composition and stability in Slovenia (1992–2013)

The prime minister of the cabinet	The term of cabinet in power	The party composition of the cabinet/minister positions' design	Type/design of the cabinet	The party of the prime minister	The mandates of the cabinet parties/the composition of the parliament	CD.d.	CD.y.	ICS
Janez Drnovšek (I)	11.01.1993 – 29.03.1994	LDS + SKD + ZLSD + SDSS	CMJ/SWC	LDS	55/90	438	1,20	0,31
Janez Drnovšek (II)	29.03.1994 – 26.01.1996	LDS + SKD + ZLSD	CMJ/MWC	LDS	51/90	657	1,80	0,46
Janez Drnovšek (III)	27.01.1996 – 10.11.1996	LDS + SKD	CMN	LDS	37/90	283	0,78	0,20
Janez Drnovšek (IV)	27.02.1997 – 08.04.2000	LDS + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	49/90	1121	3,07	0,79
Andrej Bajuk	07.06.2000 – 15.10.2000	SLS + SDSS	CMN	SLS	35/90	128	0,35	0,09
Janez Drnovšek (V)	30.11.2000 – 02.12.2002	LDS + ZLSD + SLS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	54/90	722	1,98	0,51
Anton Rop (I)	19.12.2002 – 07.04.2004	LDS + ZLSD + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/SWC	LDS	58/90	468	1,28	0,33
Anton Rop (II)	08.04.2004 – 02.12.2004	LDS + ZLSD + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	LDS	49/90	234	0,64	0,16
Janez Janša (I)	03.12.2004 – 21.09.2008	SDSS + NS-KLS + SLS + DeSUS	CMJ/MWC	SDSS	49/90	1368	3,75	0,96
Borut Pahor (I)	21.11.2008 – 09.05.2011	ZLSD + Zares + DeSUS + LDS	CMJ/MWC	ZLSD	50/90	888	2,43	0,77
Borut Pahor (II)	09.05.2011 – 27.06.2011	ZLSD + Zares + LDS	CMN	ZLSD	43/90	48	0,13	0,04
Borut Pahor (III)	27.06.2011 – 20.10.2011	ZLSD + LDS	CMN	ZLSD	33/90	113	0,31	0,10
Janez Janša (II)	28.01.2012 – 23.01.2013	SDSS + DL + SLS + DeSUS + NS-KLS	CMJ/SWC	SDSS	50/90	355	0,97	н.д.
Janez Janša (III)	23.01.2013 – 22.02.2013	SDSS + SLS + DeSUS + NS-KLS	CMN	SDSS	42/90	29	0,08	н.д.
Alenka Bratušek	20.03.2013 – acting	LZJ-PS + ZLSD + DL + DeSUS	CMJ/SWC	LZJ-PS	52/90	acting		

Natalia Khoma

Політичний гепенінг як протестна форма політичної участі

Аналізується політичний гепенінг як протестна форма політичної участі. Гепенінг розглядається як напрямок акційного мистецтва (акціонізму); це певна форма дій, акцій, учинків, під час яких митці намагаються залучити глядачів до гри, сценарій якої окреслений лише приблизно. Доводиться особливість політичного гепенінгу — це не просто видовище, а зовні спонтанне (спровоковане, імпровізоване, непередбачуване і под.) дійство, учасниками якого стають не лише актори, але й цілком випадкові люди.

Ключові слова: *акціонізм, політичний гепенінг, політична гра, постмодерн.*

Political happening as a protest form of political participation

Political happening is analyzed as a protest form of political participation. The happening is the direction of the promotional art (Actionism); this is a certain form of acts, actions, works in which artists are trying to attract viewers to the play,.It is shown that peculiarity of political happening is not just sight, but outside spontaneous action (provoked, improvised, unpredictable and similar), participants of which are not only actors, but also completely random people.

Key words: *actionism, political happening, political game, postmodern.*

Happeningi polityczny jako forma protestu w życiu politycznym

Happeningi polityczny jest analizowany jako uczestnictwa forma protestu politycznego. Happeningi uznać za promocyjną kierunku sztuki (aktsionizm); jest to pewna forma aktów, działań, prac, w których artyści starają się przyciągnąć widzów do gry, scenariusz, który jest w przybliżeniu. Pokazano, że osobliwość happeningu politycznego nie tylko wzrok, ale poza spontaniczne działania (sprowokowany, improwizowane, nieprzewidywalne i podobne), uczestnicy, które są nie tylko aktorzy, ale także zupełnie przypadkowych ludzi.

Słowa kluczowe: *aktsionizm, happeningi polityczny, gra polityczna, postmodernistyczna.*

Age of postmodern actualized study of the effectiveness of traditional forms of political participation and shifted the emphasis from traditional political practices (voting, meetings, etc.) to different form of social and political participation. In postmodern reality political action is fragmented and provocative; it is based on the play, and the range of social and political roles of a man is constantly expanding. It seems that modern political action can achieve efficiency by giving it emotional colouring. The ways of such "colouring" are art technologies of actionism (happening, performance, etc.). The goal of our research is to explore possibilities of aesthetization of political by means of actionism, and in particular via political happening.

Philosophical and methodological basis of analysis were studied by G. Arendt, J.Butler, S. Sontag, J.-P. Sartre, and others. Based on the understanding of happening as an art form, it is important to analyze its kind – political happening, and figure out the potential of these artistic and cultural forms of social and political life of modern society.

There is understanding of the nature of the *action* as an act underlies in the base of the various forms of actionism. Action is a planned artistic performance (often with ideological or social colouring), performed by an artist (a group of artists), that aims to achieve a specific, meaningful for the artist, goal.

The American philosopher post-structuralist J. Butler, interpreting events of "Arab Spring", wrote: "For politics to take place, the body must appear" . But the political actionism is not all the diversity of bodily gestures; first and foremost, action is deed. Fulfilling any political tactics or realizing any artistic device, the action seeks its form and its meaning, focusing on the dynamics of direct links, rather than on institutional rules of the play. The action is a public act – or rather, it creates direct publicity through direct action. Actionist cannot always assume what will the action be, but s/he always knows what effect (outcome) s/he wants to achieve.

All practices of actionism are avant-garde; radical artist intrudes into the unprepared for this public area, and is followed by a public scandal, with this provoking government to react, and audience to think. *"Provocative"* nature is its distinguishing feature. Actionism is mostly asocial, but it is such for something common and higher; it is going over the limit of law or public morality, but actionists do this declaring something socially meaningful (for example, criticism of the government in terms of suppression of political opposition). Forms of life and forms of public actions of actionists challenge existing social order. For example, violent reaction is caused by actions of feminist punk-rock band "Pussy Riot", art group "War", the representative of the Russian radical art Pavlenskyy P., etc. The last, in particular, in his public art events ("Carcass", "Fixation", "Liberty", "Separation") shocks Russian society and raises the question of its (society's) inability to resist the government; in the "Carcass" artist, naked and wrapped with barbed wire, laid in front of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg; with this symbolized "human existence in repressive legal system"; supporting sentenced participants

of feminist punk-rock band "Pussy Riot", P. Pavlenskyy sewed his own mouth near the Kazan Cathedral.

With their actions actionists affirm the value of politics. Making public action (by G. Arendt) is politics[1]. This politics creates common world that lots will join. Political actionism can represent politics beyond its classical forms, and sees a political role of art in a new way. Forms of life and forms of public actions of actionists challenge state government, criticize imposed myths in the form of publicly performed acts as artistic events. In contrast they develop special community relations and public action practice in the eyes of many. The art community becomes political when the community itself becomes part of the political situation.

Representatives of actionist art believe that an artist should not create static objects, but organize events, processes, performances, and therefore in all actionists' forms main emphasis is made not on a specific artistic product, but the *process* of its creation. This artistic ideology encouraged artists to explore new means of artistic expression, namely – dynamics, processing, dramatization, intensification of play components, audience appeal.

Political happening (*eng. Happening* – event, occurrence, that takes place) is little-studied protest form of political participation. This form is often perceived as not serious because of its theatrical nature. Happening in the broadest sense is the direction of actionism; this is a certain form of acts, actions, works in which artists are trying to attract viewers to the play, scenario of which is outlined approximately. *Happening* (in art) is understood as a kind of theatrical performance, in which event and action are the aim themselves and not part of the plot; this is a type of movable work, a playful improvisation that gives out various unconscious impulses. This is a kind of view of life; happening is often defined as *"active"* ("effective") pop art.

Theory and practice of happening are based on artistic experience of Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Theatre of the Absurd. J.-P. Sartre calls A. Artaud's "theatre of cruelty" to be the forerunner of the happening, the basic tenet of which was the negation of theatricality as such in the name of real sense of the events in which (at the level of inner feelings) audience is engaged. Happening was born on the edge of modernism and postmodernism (founded in 1952), American musician and philosopher J. Cage (1912-1992) was the founder of the practice of happening, and his student – A. Kaprou (1927-2006) – author of the term (suggested it in 1958). J. Cages silent "musical" plays, A. Kaprou's choreographic composition were aimed at provocation viewer to act; art was the manipulation of objects and people in space.

Of course, the play is one of the fundamentals of human life and culture since archaic times[2]. "The whole world – theatre, and people in it – the actors" (Shakespeare). In this theatre a man is a permanent player with dynamic role rotation (voter, volunteer soldier, politician, bureaucrat, party member, volunteer, etc.). Play is a device of mastering certain socio-cultural

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[1]   J. Butler, *Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street* http://eipcp.net/transversal/1011/ butler/uk [15.03.2015]

[2]   Х.Арендт, Vita activa, или О деятельной жизни. — Санкт-Петербург 2000, s. 14-16.

experience and skills, a powerful force that actively creates social and political relations. It foresees free-expression rights and can be deployed in various ways, including political ones. Socio-political life of democratic society has a powerful origin of a play. Politics as a field of competition cannot exist without elements of a play.

Man of the XXI century, according to K. Stanislavska, is "a subject of visual representation, living his life in the atmosphere of total visualizing and feeling himself both as audience and as performer"[3]. Art involves (encourages participation in the action) viewer who consciously or unconsciously tries the role of co-author and co-creator. Modern public does not want just to watch – the viewer needs stronger impressions and feelings, and this "pursuit of emotions" ensures that he becomes a full-fledged member of the visual action.

Political happening as a kind of "action art" is based on improvisation, simultaneous coexistence of different artistic and non-artistic actions and spontaneous reaction of participants. It combines spaces of different kinds of art and artistic activity: music, dance, poetry, visual art, video, movie, direct environmental phenomena (weather phenomena, street noise, etc)[4]. Mixing various theatrical elements (use of colour, music and lighting effects when body movements, gestures and facial expression become the sense of separate compositions), and their combination with life objects and phenomena – is a distinctive feature of happening. There is no plot and logical connection between its separate parts. Happening is played in galleries, railway stations, squares and other places not designed for performances; emphasis is made on environmental conditions – and then breaks the stereotype of "audience – scene". Cultural specialists emphasize that city is an open platform for spectacular and playful, creative experiments in public space and enables communication between particular artist and viewer within contemporary street art[5] [8]. Analysis of various happening shows: in all cases, artists offer to identify life and stage, spectacle and reality, preferring street to traditional auditoriums and halls. For example, "Pussy Riot" in their actions settled in underground, on the roofs of trolleybuses, in temples, on surface of railway transport tanks, etc, to address to the widest audience, and to break traditional ideas about the role of musician-artist. Architects emphasize that modern theatre tends to return to open urban space with specialized facilities; it can be regarded as a fundamental and essential element of creative public spaces of a city[6].

During happening positions of viewer and performer shift: authors-artists tend to erase the boundaries between them, therefore provocative actions to the public are normal in order to involve everyone into action. Space of the play is central in the happening, as everybody can

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[3] О. Андрієнко, *Ігрове начало у бутті демократичного суспільства*, „Наука. Релігія. Суспільство", 2009 nr 2, s. 123–127.

[4] К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністстської видовищної культури*, "Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого", 2013 nr 13, s.180-189.

[5] М. Переверзева, *Хэппенинги Джона Кейджа,* "Harmony: Международный музыкальный культурологический журнал", http://harmony.musigi-dunya.az/rus/archivereader.asp?s= 1&txtid=114 [12.03.2015].

[6] К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністстської видовищної культури*, "Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого", 2013 nr 13, s.180-189.

express themselves in it that is action within the spectacle[7]. Stress behaviour of the public in the context of "accidental" rebuilds relations between people, between man and thing (including streets, shops, products, images of popular culture and urban folklore).

The purpose of art in happening is the political process itself, and artistic origin during its performance should manifest itself within all "players" – both author – artists and audience. For everyone – it is emersion of energy, awakening of sudden emotions, test of reaction to unforeseen events. In political happening significant emphasis is placed on the improvisational origin; there if no specific event scenario: development of storylines and situation is foreseen partially, and the results of the play are not always known. Events take place in real time, always for the first time and are never repeated. All the preparatory work in political happening is performed by artists themselves – those, who are invited to participate – directly appear within the *"event"*. Peculiarity of political happening is not just spectacle, but outside spontaneous action (provoked, improvised, unpredictable, etc.), participants of which are not only actors, but also completely random people (such participation is mandatory in political happening).

American researcher of happening, S. Sontag identifies two features of it: 1) *behaviour with audience* (provocations towards public, which often go beyond allowable and decent limit, actionists expect to embarrass public – and via shock "drawn" emotional feedback from the viewer. It can direct the course of the happening in a different direction, and a viewer – can become co-performer); 2) *behaviour towards time* (it is impossible to forecast how happening will develop and for how long it will last, even experienced audience of happening does not always understand whether it is finish or not)[8].

Organizers of political happening often unite into quasi-party organizations, activity of which is directed at disclosure of illusiveness of particular ideology. In particular, pioneers of political happening in Ukraine were considered to be "Rays of Juche" actions (since September 1990). "Rays of Juche" is considered to be the first (it originated in 1988 among Ukrainian Students' Union) parody(orange) type party (such organizations parody activity of political parties and movements, adopting the outward features of political parties, they make frankly ridiculous and absurd goals as program ones) in the Soviet Union after Perestroika. There took place symbolic M. Gorbachev's book burying, there also were round-dances around the monument of V. Lenin, editors of insufficiently communist newspapers were called to ideological fight, etc.

On the post-Soviet territories to such pseudo-organizations belonged following: "Dictatorship of Pluralism Party", "Orange Alternative" movement "Subtropical Russia". As examples of political happening can be considered activity of following: 1) Party of Beer Lovers

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[7] А. Хір, Б. Гой. *Театральне мистецтво як формівний чинник громадського простору на прикладі м. Ужгорода*, "Вісник Національного університету "Львівська політехніка", 2014 nr 793, s. 201-207.

[8] Е. Станиславская, *Хэппенинг как действенно-зрелищная форма искусства XX в.,* http://webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:ZJTM42EwHtMJ:www.actual-art.org/en/k2010-2/st2010/96-viz/201-kheppening-dejstvenno-zrelishchnaya-forma-iskusstva. html+&cd=1&hl =uk&ct=clnk&gl=ua [15.03.2015]

(for example, sending remedies to relieve hangover effect as a birthday present to B.Yeltsin in 1995); 2) "Dictatorship of Pluralism Party" (celebration of third anniversary of miraculous escape of B.Yeltsin from unknown river, that took place on September 28, 1992 on Pushkin Square in Moscow, and where two participants of celebration officiated the ceremony of "*Yelt-sinization*", during which they were thrown into the fountain with sacks on their heads); 3) movement "Violet"(declared: "Violets will come – lots will go!", "The future is either violet or there is no future at all", etc.); 4) "Subtropical Russia" (improvement of political climate by increasing minimum temperature of the environment to +20 ° C and reduction of the water boiling point to +50 ° C).

2014-2015 predetermined conduction of series of political happenings to support Ukraine. In particular, activists of Russian movement "Blue Rider", who were popular because of a row of outstanding actions, one of which was held to support Ukraine (Moscow, November 2014). The happening was held with the participation of two participants (O. Basov, E. Avilov): one, covered with Ukrainian flag, was lying on the ground at the pedestal of the monument to the city-hero of Kyiv, and the other one with a can of red liquid offered to sample "Ukrainian blood." Flag reminded that protesters, killed on the Square, were wrapped with it and blood imitation symbolized protest against those who rejoice at deaths of Ukrainians. On August 6, 2014 Petersburg activist Kado went on Nevsky Prospect as "blind Russia with blood on her hands." Woman dressed in the colours of the Russian flag and blindfold, uttered loud crying on one note and fell on the asphalt. On November 21, 2014 political happening to commemorate the anniversary of the beginning of Euromaidan with burning of the stuffed animal with the face of Putin took place near Moscow Kremlin.

Playfulness and humour of happening border with horror to social reality and at the same time help to overcome it. Political happening gives possibility to laugh over the fact that in everyday life has features of the highest formality and seriousness, and in such way helps understanding of the conventionality of many phenomena in social and political life[9].

Political happening embodies communication model «artist – viewer"; it is an interactive form of artistic practices with social and political orientation. In the form of happening the idea of erasement of boundaries between artist and audience is very clear[10]. Happening is a good example of how the play (the embodiment of the freedom of human spirit) obtains aesthetical look and becomes a spectacle. "The desire for spontaneity, direct physical contact with public, increased efficiency of art has resulted in the concept of life carnivalization"[11] – unity of fear and laughter ambivalence of life and death, rebirth through self-destruction.

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[9] С.Зонтаг, Хепенинги: Искусство безоглядных сопоставлений. Мысль как страсть: Избранные эссе 1960–70-х годов, Москва 1997, s. 37-45.

[10] О. Андрієнко, *Ігрове начало у бутті демократичного суспільства*, "Наука. Релігія. Суспільство", 2009 nr 2, s. 123–127.

[11] К. Станіславська, *Митець і глядач: погляд на взаємини у модусах постмодерністстської видовищної культури*, "Науковий вісник Київського національного університету театру, кіно і телебачення імені І. К. Карпенка-Карого", 2013 nr 13, s. 180-189.

Despite some frivolity of political happening, we emphasize the need for scientific understanding of this form of political activity, as well as other forms of postmodern political actionism, because contemporary art is politics of freedom. Various forms of actionism can provide politics beyond its classical forms. Actionism allows a new answer to questions about the political role of art.